The results of the war between Russia and Ukraine in the formation of the new world order

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Member of the faculty of the Higher National Defense University

2 Graduated with a PhD in strategic management

Abstract

Russia's main strategy over the past years has been to prevent NATO's advance and influence to the east and Russia's close security environment and prevent Ukraine from joining the European Union. Based on this, during a special operation, which is considered a preventive measure from the Kremlin's point of view, to prevent future threats, the war between Russia and Ukraine began. The main goal of the research is to analyze the characteristics, scenarios and goals of the war between Russia and Ukraine in the formation of the new world order. The type of research is applied and it has been done in a systematic, descriptive-exploratory qualitative method, the method of collecting data is documentary and library and interviews with 10 experts. According to the findings of the research, the features of war are described in 9 different categories, the war between Russia and Ukraine is erosive and both countries are practically caught in the swamp of war. What happened to Ukraine today is the result of trusting the West. Russia followed three maximum, medium and minimum goals in this war, which has reached the minimum goal, which is to control the Donbas region. The research results show that the war between Russia and Ukraine has 35 special features. Russia has won the minimum war in terms of military form, but it has failed from the point of view of the "War of Narratives". Ukraine's military doctrine is shifting from "defensive to deterrence and becoming offensive." Russia's military doctrine has changed from "offensive to defensive" in some areas. The primary result of this war is the formation of the multipolar order and the end of the unipolar order centered on America

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